C&J Industries, Inc. et al v. Edward O. Bailey et al : Brief of Defendants-Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1982
C&J Industries, Inc. et al v. Edward O. Bailey et al :
Brief of Defendants-Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Kay M. Lewis; Jensen & Lewis; Attorneys for Appellants;
T. Quentin Cannon; Cannon & Duffin; Attorneys for Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, C&J Industries v. Bailey, No. 18327 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3015
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
C & J INDUSTRIES, INC., ) 
a corporation, A. ROBERT 




Appellants, ) Case No. 18327 
vs. ) 
EDWARD O. BAILEY and ) 




REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
Thomas A. Duffin 
T. Quentin Cannon 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Respondents 
Kay M. Lewis 
JENSEN & LEWIS, P.C. 
320 South 300 East, Suite 1 






_. .... d:;~ Supreme Court, Utat. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
C & J INDUSTRIES, INC., ) 
a corporation, A. ROBERT 







EDWARD o. BAILEY and ) 




Case No. 18327 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
Thomas A. Duffin 
T. Quentin Cannon 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Respondents 
Kay M. Lewis 
JENSEN & LEWIS, P.C. 
320 South 300 East, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 
POINT I 
THE HOLDING OF THE TRIAL COURT 
THAT COLLINS AND JAMES WERE BUYERS 
UNDER THE BAILEY CONTRACT IS IN 
CONFLICT WITH THE HOLDING OF THIS 
COURT ON THE FIRST APPEAL OF THIS 
CASE AND SHOULD BE REVERSED UNDER 
THE PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW OF THE 
CASE • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
POINT II 
COURTS OF THIS STATE MAY NOT, IN 
THE GUISE OF INTERPRETATION, ALTER 
THE UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS OF A CONTRACT 
BY WHICH THE PARTIES IDENTIFIED 
• • • • 
AND DEFINED THAT A CORPORATION WAS 
"BUYER" IN THAT CONTRACT • • • • • • • • • 
POINT III 
THIS COURT CAN NEITHER IGNORE 
THE CORPORATE STATUS OF C & J 
INDUSTRIES NOR PRESUME THE 
EXISTENCE OF AGENCY OF COLLINS 
AND JAMES AT THE TIME OF EXECUTION 
OF THE BURGIE CONTRACT • • • • • • 
POINT IV 
THE EQUITABLE MAXIM "EQUITY 
REGARDS AS DONE THAT WHICH SHOULD 
BE DONE" IS NOT APPLICABLE TO 




THIS CASE. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 11 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ii 
POINT V 
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR AN 
ARGUMENT THAT A CORPORATION CAN 
RATIFY THE ACTS OF INDIVIDUALS 
PERFORMED ON THEIR OWN BEHALF 
AND THUS MAKE THOSE ACTS ITS OWN 
• • • • • 
POINT VI 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE WILL 
NOT SUPPORT AN APPLICATION OF 
THE ALTER EGO DOCTRINE • • • 
• • • • • • • 
CONCLUSION. • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • 
Cases Cited 
Angelus Securities Corp. v. Ball, 
67 P.2d 152 (Cal. 1937) ••• 
• • • • • • • 
Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc., 
363 P.2d 498 (Utah 1961) • • • • • • • • • 
Fuqua Hornes, Inc., v. Grosvenor, 
569 P.2d 854 (Ariz. 1977) •• • • • • • • • 
Helper State Bank v. Crus, 
81 P.2d 359 (Utah 1938) • • • • • • • • • 
Holter v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 
459 P.2d 61 (Wash. 1969) ••••• • • • • 









306 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1962) • • • • • • • 3, 4 
Mccallum v. Campbell-Simpson Motor Co., 
349 P.2d 986 (Ida. 1960) ••••• 
McCray v. Sapulpa Petroleum Co., 
• • • • 7 
226 P. 875 (Okla. 1923). • • • • • • • • • 14. 
Noll Baking & Ice Cream Co. v. Sparks 
Milling Co., 26 N.E.2d 425 (Ill. 1940) • • 7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
iii 
Norman v. Murray First Thrift, 
596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979). • • • • • 
Petty v. Clark, 192 P.2d 589 (Utah 1948). 
Radio Corp. v. Philadelphia Storage 
Battery Co., 6 A.2d 329 (Del. 1939). 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 





State v. Sundling, 281 P.2d 499 (Mont. 1955). • 12 
West Nesbitt, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 
266 A.2d 469 (Vt. 1970) ••••••• • • • 11 
White v. Higgins, 116 F.2d 312 (1st Cir. 1940). 4 
Other Authorities 
Pomeroy's Equitable Jurisprudence, 
4th Ed., §365 ••••••••• • • • • • • 11 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
C & J INDUSTRIES, INC., ) 
a corporation, A. ROBERT 







Case No. 18327 
EDWARD O. BAILEY and ) 




REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As previously set forth, the issue before this 
court is whether the acts of Plaintiffs-Appellants triggered 
an acceleration clause in a contract which provides: 
"In the event Buyer desires to sell or 
assign, transfer or convey Buyer's 
rights under this contract or Buyer's 
interest in said premises then and in 
that event the Buyer must pay in full 
the outstanding balance due on this 
contract prior to said transaction." 
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POINT I 
THE HOLDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT 
COLLINS AND JAMES WERE BUYERS UNDER 
THE BAILEY CONTRACT IS IN CONFLICT 
WITH THE HOLDING OF THIS COURT ON THE 
FIRST APPEAL OF THIS-CASE AND SHOULD 
BE REVERSED UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF 
THE LAW OF THE CASE. 
On the first appeal of the instant case, this court 
determined that: 
and: 
"It is apparent from the second contract 
-- and the Baileys consistently point 
out -- that the buyer under the first 
contract, C & J, is not the seller under 
the second contract." 618 P.2d 58, 59. 
"This court cannot as a matter of law 
ignore the corporate status of C & J 
Industries, Inc., and thereby equate C & 
J with the individuals Collins and 
James." Ibid, 59, 60. 
Both the finding that the buyer on the first 
contract was not the seller on the second contract and the 
finding that the corporate status of C & J must be recog-
nized were necessary to the disposition made on appeal. A 
finding to the contrary on either issue would have concluded 
the case in favor of the Respondents (Baileys). 
In the instant appeal, Respondents seek to uphold 
the decision of the trial court that the buyer on the first 
contract was also the seller on the second contract. 
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Respondents assert as an alternative basis for affirmance 
that this court ignore the corporate status of C & J by 
applying the "alter ego" principle. Both of these arguments 
are in clear conflict with the holdings of this court on the 
initial appeal. 
"The principle of the 'law of the case' 
has been recognized by this court. 
Where questions of law and fact are the 
same the decision on the first appeal 
becomes the law of the case and is 
binding upon the parties; upon the trial 
court; and upon the appellate court. 
And this is so however disputed or 
controversial the law involved may 
be." Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc., 
363 P.2d 498 (Utah 1961); Petty v. 
Clark, 192 P.2d 589 (Utah 1948); 
Helper ~tate Bank v. Crus, 81 P.2d 
359 (Utah 1938). 
The policy behind "the law of the case" was 
expressed in Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Roosth, 
306 F.2d 110 (5th Cir., 1962). Where there is no change in 
the factual situation and only a question of law is 
decided, 
" ••• [A] most important consideration 
is stability in the law -- a sort of 
permanence and sureness in decision 
apart from the make-up or composition of 
the particular tribunal so far as the 
person of the Judges is concerned •••• 
Without implying any improper purpose 
to litigants or their counsel, or 
acknowledging anything more than, as 
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human beings, Judges will unavoidably 
have differences in emphasis, approach 
or view on close questions in given 
areas, if the practice is followed for 
each succeedng panel' to arrive at its 
own decisions, the losing party on the 
first appeal will naturally strive to 
bring it back a second, third or fourth 
time until all are exhausted." Ibid at 
117. 
It would be unfortunate if on a second appeal 
counsel felt free to argue again, as a matter of course, 
points decided on a previous appeal. White v. Higgins, 
116 F.2d 312 (1st Cir., 1940). 
In the instant case, this court made a deter-
mination of law, after examination of the contracts in 
question, that the buyer on the first contract was not the 
seller on the second contract. The case was then remanded 
for a determination of agency. When the trial court made a 
finding on the agency issue, it was to enter judgment for 
the appropriate party. 
The holding of the trial court on the issue of who 
was buyer under the contract reopened an issue already 
determined by this court. The same contracts were presented 
and examined and only a question of law was to be determined. 
Under the law of the case, the holding of this cour~ on the 
original appeal must stand and the holding of the trial 
court must be reversed. 
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The same reasoning applies to the attempt to 
have this court ignore the corporate status of c & J 
Industries through application of the alter ego principle. 
This court has already determined that C & J Industries 
cannot be equated with the individuals Collins and James. 
No new evidence was introduced on remand to show a need 
for application of this equitable remedy. This court 
is being asked to abandon its former determination of an 
issue upon a mere presumption that inequity may occur. 
Clearly application of the law of the case is appropriate 
in this instance. 
POINT II 
COURTS OF THIS STATE MAY NOT, IN THE 
GUISE OF INTERPRETATION, ALTER THE 
UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS OF A CONTRACT BY WHICH 
THE PARTIES IDENTIFIED AND DEFINED THAT 
A CORPORATION WAS "BUYER" IN THAT CONTRACT. 
The issue in the instant case is not whether 
Collins and James were principals or guarantors under 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract with the Baileys. 
The real question posed is whether a court, in the name 
of construction or interpretation, may designate Collins 
and James as "buyers" under a contract where all references 
to "buyer" in that contract refer solely to C & J 
Industries. 
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The importance of the question "who is the buyer 
under the contract?" comes from the wording of the acceler-
ation clause in the Bailey contract which is triggered 
only by a sale or transfer by the "buyer". The Respon-
dents and the trial court have unduly compounded an issue 
which this court viewed as simple: 
"It is apparent from the second contract 
••• that the buyer under the first 
contract, C & J, is not the seller under 
the second contract." (Emphasis 
added.) 618 P.2d 58, 59. 
Rules of construction of contracts support the 
simple and apparent conclusion drawn by this court on the 
first appeal of this case. 
Parties to a contract are free to define terms 
or words in a contract. A contract will be interpreted 
in accord with the meaning assigned to words by the parties. 
When a word is used in one sense in one part of a contract, 
it is given the same meaning throughout. Radio Corp. v. 
Philadelphia Storage Battery Co., 6 A.2d 329 (Del. 1939); 
Holter v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 459 P.2d 61 (Wash. 
1969); 17 C.J.S. "Contracts" §303. 
A court cannot rewrite an unambiguous contract 
for the purpose of accomplishing what in its opinion· is 
proper. Sellgren v. Boyer, 297 P.2d 864 (Ore. 1956). 
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It is also improper for a court to review an agreement under 
the guise of construction or interpretation and then to 
provide for a contingency against which a party failed to 
protect himself. Noll Baking & Ice Cream Co. v. Sparks 
Milling Co., 26 N.E.2d 425 (Ill. 1940); Mccallum v. Campbell-
Simpson Motor Co., 349 P.2d 986 (Ida. 1960). 
Examination of the unambiguous Uniform Real 
Estate Contract and the application of basic rules of 
construction reveal the apparency of the holding of 
this court on the first appeal. 
Paragraph 1 of the Bailey contract acts as a 
definitional clause identifying the parties to the covenants 
in the contract. The clause states nc & J INDUSTRIES, 
INCORPORATED, a corporation, [is] hereinafter designated 
as Buyer." There are no intervening clauses between 
paragraph one and paragraph 3(a) that would support any 
conclusion but that the term "buyer" as used in paragraph 
3(a) is a designation meaning "C & J Industries". The only 
act that could trigger the acceleration clause in paragraph 
3(a) is a sale, transfer, etc., by C & J Industries. 
The terms of the "Guaranty" also indicate a 
clear understanding by the parties that C & J, Collins and 
James were separate entities under the contract and only 
C & J was designated as buyer. 
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" ••• [I]n order that Buyer may purchase 
said property said A. Robert Collins and 
Glade N. James desire to guaranty the 
performance of said Corporation, each 
personally and individually." (Emphasis 
added.) 
"Buyer, and A. Robert Collins and Glade 
N. James-are each jointly and individually 
bound •••• " (Emphasis added.) 
" ••• [A]nd said C & J Industries, 
Incorporated, a corporation, as buyer, 
and said A. Robert Collins and Glade N. 
James, individually and jointly ••.• " 
(Emphasis added.) 
The signature block which appears at the end of 
the contract and at the end of the "Guaranty" also designates 
C & J as buyer. 
"BUYER: 
C & J INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED 
By /s/ A. Robert Collins 
/s/ A. Robert Collins 
A. Robert Collins 
/s/ Glade N. James 
Glade N. James" 
Even if an argument is made that there is ambiguity 
as to who is identified as buyer by the signature block, 
the ambiguity must be resolved against the Respondents as 
drafters of the contract and in favor of consistency in the 
use of the term "buyer", defined and used to mean C & J 
Industries throughout the text of the contract and guaranty. 
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Although a broader form could have been drafted, 
the acceleration clause in the Bailey contract provided only 
for the contingency of sale or transfer by the buyer. It is 
not the province of the courts of this state to determine 
the wisdom or folly of terms in a contract that are agreed 
upon by the parties. C & J was defined as buyer in the 
Bailey contract. The sale in the second contract was made by 
Collins and James as individuals. It is improper for a 
court under the guise of interpreting who is a principal to 
the contract to alter the unambiguous designation made by 
the parties naming C & J as buyer to also include Collins 
and James as buyers when the clear provisions of the contract 
are otherwise. To do so would be to create for Respondents 
a contract with covenants more advantangeous to them than 
those in the original contract they saw fit to enter. The 
basis of the holding of this court on the initial appeal 
that the buyer on the first contract is not the seller on 
the second contract is readily apparent. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT CAN NEITHER IGNORE THE 
CORPORATE STATUS OF C & J INDUSTRIES 
NOR PRESUME THE EXISTENCE OF AGENCY 
OF COLLINS AND JAMES AT THE TIME OF 
EXECUTION OF THE BURGIE CONTRACT. 
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The argument made in Point II (1) of Res-
pendents' Brief is somewhat ambiguous. The heading 
indicates a contention that at the time of the execution 
of the Burgie contract, Collins and James were acting 
as agents of C & J Industries in distributing corporate 
assets following dissolution of the corporation. 
If this is in fact the argument, an inherent 
weakness in it is the fact that C & J was found to be 
a de facto corporation at the time of the Burgie contract. 
(TR. 59, 1. 14-23) The record supports this finding. 
The Burgie contract was executed on March 9, 1979, over 
two years prior to the issuance of the Certificate of 
Involuntary Dissolution of C & J Industries on March 31, 
1981. It is therefore clear that there could have been no 
post-dissolution distribution by anyone at the time of the 
Burgie contract. 
A close examination of the argument also reveals 
that no facts or bases are asserted in support of the 
contention that Collins and James acted as agents for C & J. 
The argument merely attempts to set forth a factual situation 
in which an agency relationship could exist, but gives no 
reason for concluding that the relationship did in fact 
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exist. No matter what setting is created for the Burgie 
contract, the issue of agency remains the same. This court 
is thus in a position where it is being asked to presume the 
existence of agency because of the relationship of the 
individuals to the corporation. Appellants therefore 
reassert the impropriety of such a presumption as set forth 
in Point IV of their first Brief. 
POINT IV 
THE EQUITABLE MAXIM "EQUITY REGARDS 
AS DONE THAT WHICH SHOULD BE DONE" 
IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
The equitable maxim that equity regards as 
done that which should be· done is applied only where 
there is an equitable obligation which creates a present 
• duty to act on one party and a corresponding duty to 
perform on another. The principle does not operate in favor 
of every person but only for one who holds the equitable 
right to have the act performed as against the person 
upon whom the duty of performance has devolved. Pomeroy's 
Equitable Jurisprudence, 4th Ed., §365. 
Case law reveals that for the maxim to apply, 
there must be an underlying agreement creating a present 
obligation to perform. Acts to be performed at a future 
date are not subject to the maxim. West Nesbitt, Inc., v. 
Ralston Purina Co., 266 A.2d 469 (Vt. 1970). 
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Appellants are unable to ascertain an agreement 
between themselves and Respondents that created any duty 
to act in regards to a contemplated dissolution of C & J 
Industries or which created any right in ·Respondents 
to have dissolution and distribution carried out. In 
absence of an agreement creating a present equitable 
duty in Appellants and a corresponding equitable right 
in Respondents, the equitable maxim is not applicable. 
POINT V 
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR AN 
ARGUMENT THAT A CORPORATION CAN 
RATIFY THE ACTS OF INDIVIDUALS 
PERFORMED ON THEIR OWN BEHALF AND 
THUS MAKE THOSE ACTS ITS OWN. 
"Ratification does not result from the 
aff irmance by the alleged principal of a 
transaction had by an alleged agent with 
a third person unless in the transaction 
the supposed agent purported to ~~~-on 
account of the reputed principal." 
(Emphasis added.) Stat~_ v. Suf?.d_ll~, 
281 P.2d 499 (Mont. 1955), citing 
Mechem on Agency; Restatement of the 
Law of Agency; Annotation 124 A.L.R. at 
893; 2 C.J.S. "Agency" §41; 2 Am.Jur.2d 
"Agency" §222; and individual cases 
from 11 other jurisdictions. 
Where an "agent" acts in his individual capac.ity 
it must be shown that the principal retained the benefits 
or there can be no ratification. Fuqua Homes, Inc. ·v. 
Grosvenor, 569 P.2d 854 (Az. 1977). 
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The findings of the lower court were stated as 
"Now the evidence before me is that both 
individuals assumed they were signing as 
through it.was their personal property" 
(TR. 5 9 , 1. 2 5-2 7) • 
"But if those same individuals are 
buyers under Exhibit 1 and are therefore 
bound by Paragraph 3(a) it isn't going 
to make any difference whether or not 
they were acting as the agent on the 
sale of Exhibit 2 or whether they were 
selling personally." (TR. 59, 1. 28-30; 
60, 1. 1-2) 
It is clear that the trial court made no ruling 
on the credibility of the evidence concerning whether Collins 
and James acted in an individual capacity or as agents of 
C & J in contracting with Burgie. It would be improper for 
this court to ignore the only evidence presented as incredible 
and hold that Collins and James represented to act or bind 
C & J Industries on the Burgie contract. Inasmuch as the only 
evidence on record indicates that Collins and James acted as 
individuals in executing the Burgie contract and did not 
purport to bind C & J, there is no basis in law upon acts of 
Collins and James on their own behalf could be ratified by 
c & J. 
Another well-settled principle of ratification is 
that the persons who wrongfully assumed the power to contract 
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cannot ratify their own acts on behalf of a corporation. 
Angelus Securities Corp. v. Ball, 67 P.2d 152 (Cal., 1937); 
McCray v. Sapulpa Petroleum Co., 226 P. 875 (Okla., 1923). 
Under this principle, Collins and James could not ratify 
their own acts even if they were made on behalf of C & J. 
POINT VI 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE WILL NOT SUPPORT 
AN APPLICATION OF THE ALTER EGO DOCTRINE. 
Respondents have correctly pointed out in their 
brief that there are two prerequisites to the application 
of the alter ego doctrine which ignores the corporate 
status of a corporation and equates the corporate entity 
with its individual owners. 
"(l) There must be such unity of interest 
and ownership that the separate personali-
ties of the corporation and the individual 
no longer exist, viz., that the corpora-
tion is, in fact, the alter ego of one 
or a few individuals; and 
"(2) The observance of the corporate 
form would sanction a fraud, promote 
injustice, or an inequitable result 
would follow." Norman v. Murray First 
Thrift, 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979). 
While the principle has been properly set forth, 
there is no indication of why the principle has any relevance 
or application to the facts of the instant case. Outside 
making sweeping allegations of fraud and inequity, Respon-
dents have failed to demonstrate amy reason to apply 
this principle. 
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There hasn't even been an allegation that the 
first prerequisite, unity of interest and loss of separate 
personality, has been met. The record does not indicate 
the composition of the board of directors at the time 
of the Burgie contract. However, a document attached to 
Respondents' "Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Defense 
and Counterclaim to the Allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint" 
indicates that at least in August of 1979 there were five 
directors of C & J Industries: A. Robert Collins, Glade N. 
James, Jessie Lee James, v. Darlene Collins and J. w. Downs. 
Of these five, only Robert Collins and Glade James were 
involved in the transaction questioned. The number and 
identity of the directors of the company is an essential 
element to show unity of interest and loss of separate 
personality of the corporation and owners. 
Once again, Respondents ask this court to presume 
that fraud or inequity would result if the corporate form 
were to be observed. Certainly the record will not support 
an allegation that fraud has been pleaded or even offered in 
proof at trial. 
Appellants have continued payments to the Respon-
dents at all times since the execution of the first contract. 
Respondents have received and continue to receive the full 
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benefit of the bargain they made. Appellants maintain that 
Respondents' security interest has been enhanced by the 
Burgie contract or that in any case that Respondents remain 
fully secured by the original contract and the subsequent 
contract with Burgie. 
At best, the alter ego principle may state 
a triable issue. In no instance has sufficient evidence 
been introduced whereby this court could affirm the 
decision of the trial court on the alter ego theory. 
CONCLUSION 
The provision of paragraph 3(a) of the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract between C & J Industries and the 
Baileys was not triggered by the sale to Burgie.- The 
designated buyer in the first contract was not the seller 
in the second contract. There has been no proof that 
Collins and James acted as agents for C & J Industries when 
they individually executed a contract with Burgie. 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants res-
pectfully petition this court to reverse the decision 
of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Plaintiffs-
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I hereby certify that I delivered two copies of 
the foregoing reply brief this 16th day of July, 1982, to 
Thomas A. Duffin and T. Quentin Cannon, 311 South State, 
Suite 380, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
/ 
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